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court immediately recognized that the legal services rendered were
necessaries performed on the infant's behalf since a habeas corpus proceeding of this nature is a determination solely for the child's best
interests and welfare. Furthermore, the court held that DRL sections
237 and 240 did not provide the exclusive remedy for recovery of the
costs of necessaries. DRL section 81 provides support for the proposition that a mother may be liable for a child's necessaries in the same
manner a father is. Other factors peculiar to this case also necessitated
this result: the father earned little more than $5,000 per year as a
barber; the mother, however, received investment income in excess
of $12,000 per year and stood to receive more if Mr. Manville's will
was admitted to probate; the separation agreement evidenced a recognition on the mother's part that she, rather than her ex-husband, was
liable for most of the child's support, and the plaintiff had relied upon
this when he consented to represent the child in the habeas corpus
proceeding.
Although the plaintiff would normally have been entitled to recover from both parents, his judgment was limited to the mother since
she was the only one he had served in the action. Nevertheless, the
mother. was entitled to contribution of five-seventeenths of the judgment from her ex-husband, an amount determined by the ratio of his
annual income to the annual income of both parents.
With this decision the court has arrived at an equitable solution
to a unique set of circumstances for which the legislature purposefully
233
chose not to provide.
DRL § 211: Conflict over applicationsfor temporary alimony continues.
The "cooling-off" statute of the DRL, section 211, has permitted
plaintiffs to serve a petition to the court for temporary alimony and
counsel fees in conjunction with a summons since 1968. This seemingly
innocuous provision has generated some sharp conflict among the lower
courts in the state. Since DRL section 215-e permits a party to a conciliation proceeding to apply directly to the conciliation commissioner
for temporary alimony, the courts have divided on the question of
which section should normally be controlling. In short, if a court
233 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19 at 83-84:

While the bill treats primarily of wives and their rights against husbands for
the awards described, it is also of moment what should be done with reference to
the husband who is without funds or support or who appears better qualified to
care for children, particularly in those cases where there is a wide disparity in
personal wealth in favor of the wife. For the time, however, if we consider that
wives still are considered the natural custodian of minor children, particularly
girls, there is virtue in the presently proposed bill.
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receives such an application, should it refer it to the assigned conciliation commissioner?
In Marrison v. Marrison,234 the Supreme Court, Queens County,
held that applications for temporary alimony and counsel fees should
be made to the court even though conciliation proceedings are pending. In Krakower v. Krakower,235 however, the Supreme Court, New
York County, held that such applications must properly be made to the
conciliation commissioner.
236
The Supreme Court, Onondaga County, in Loccke v. Loccke,
offers the most recent pronouncement on the dispute. Adopting the
Marrison view, and in reliance upon the wording of section 211, the
court denied plaintiff's motion for temporary alimony and counsel fees
instead of referring the case to a commissioner for determination.
Although the two courts have now independently reached the same
determination, it appears that Krakower suggests the more favorable
procedure.
Before section 211 was amended, it was held that petitions of this
nature should only be made to the conciliation commissioner. 237 The
theory supporting this procedure under present law suggests that to
do otherwise would subject any chance of reconciliation to an increased
risk of failure because the hearing on the motion is conducted in an
adversary setting.238 Furthermore, the history of DRL article 11-B
(the 1967 Conciliation Bureau provisions) indicates that the legislature
believed the courts would and should encourage the parties to petition
239
the conciliation commissioner in these instances.
As suggested previously,240 it appears that the express procedure
set forth by DRL section 215-e was not meant to be affected by the
1968 amendment to DRL section 211 since the latter merely permits
a party to serve a petition for temporary alimony and counsel fees
with a summons and complaint, and the former expressly provides
that "[s]uch application shall be made to the conciliation commissioner. . . ." In view of the continuing conflict over the correct pro234 160 N.Y.L.

18, Sept. 17, 1968, at 18, col. 8 (Sup. Ct. Queens County).

135 58 Misc. 2d 345, 295 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968).
230 60 Misc. 2d 281, 302 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1969).
237 Capitella v. Capitella, 55 Misc. 2d 632, 286 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1968).
238 See Krakower v. Krakower, 58 Misc. 2d 345, 295 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1968).
239 Cf. Tortorice v. Tortorice, 55 Misc. 2d 649, 650, 286 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1968); N.Y. Sess. Laws 1968, Leg. Mem. at 2309.
240 See The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rm. 686, 707 (1969).
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cedure, however, an authoritative appellate decision to this effect is
necessary.
NEW YORK CITY CIVIL COURT AcT

CCA § 1804: "Substantial justice" in small-claims case.
CCA section 1804 directs the court to
[c]onduct hearings upon small claims in such manner as to do
substantial justice between the parties according to rules of substantive law and shall not be bound by statutory provisions or
rules of practice, procedure, pleading or evidence....241

Bierman v. City of New York 242 demonstrates the usefulness and
practicality of this section. The plaintiff's basement had been damaged
when a water main ruptured in front of her home. She filed a claim
for the property damage against the city who denied any liability for
the damage. Moreover, the city informed her that since Consolidated
Edison had been working on the main her claim should properly be
brought against them. Plaintiff thereupon sued both the city and
Consolidated Edison for $300, the maximum judgment obtainable in
a small-claims action.2 43 Upon the conclusion of plaintiff's case, both
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground she had
failed to produce any evidence of negligence.
Judge Younger, referring to the previously mentioned section
1804, indicated that small-claims proceedings were intended to accomplish substantial justice between the parties according to the rules
of substantive law. However, he expressed the view that in small-claims
cases the greater emphasis must be placed upon an effort to do substantial justice as opposed to an attempt to comply with substantive
law. It would not be economically feasible for one in the plaintiff's
position to bear the burden of proving negligence on the defendants'
part in an action seeking so small a judgment. Accordingly, Judge
Younger concluded that the plaintiff need not shoulder that burden;
substantial justice here required application of a rule of strict liability.
The result in small-claims cases such as Bierman is fair and equitable. The defendants, by virtue of their control, have the knowledge
and ability to safeguard against occurrences of this nature. If that is
impossible they may recoup any losses incurred in the manner suggested
§ 1804.
242 60 Misc. 2d 497, 302 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
243 CCA § 1801.
241 CCA

